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ABSTRACT 
 
This study assesses the credibility of disinflation programs in Turkey during the nineties, where several 
programs of reform took place. We investigate the credibility of these policies building on a previous research 
made by Agenor and Taylor (1993). The model is based on two assumptions: (i) inflation is a serially correlated 
process; (ii) the definition of a proxy that is able to measure the degree of credibility of a programme. The 
empirical results show that there was a sharp loss of credibility at the end of the 1991 and at the beginning of 
the 1994 and during the Asian crisis. The Program that the Central Bank implemented after the crisis was able 
to increase the level of credibility of the CBRT policies. Loss of credibility is registered during the end of the 
1995, while various political events took place and during the 1997 following the world economic conditions 
and the outflow of capitals. 
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Introduction 
 
“Although Turkey is one of the world’s largest emerging market with a young and growing 
population of around 65 million, high and prolonged inflation over the past 25 years made 
Turkish financial markets more vulnerable than other emerging market economies. [...] 
Chronically high inflation and budget deficits are two key problems preventing the country 
from realising its full potential”1. That is the way Gazi Ercel described the economic 
situation of his country. Inflation, among others of course, is one of the most important 
problems that monetary and political authorities had to face since the seventies. Many 
attempts had been made within the past two decades but we focus our analysis on the 
effectiveness of the disinflation programmes applied in the nineties 
 
The first and maybe most severe crisis that Turkey had to face until then was in 1978-
1979. The stabilisation package that was put into effect in 1980 aimed at liberalising this 
crisis-prone economy. This can be viewed as the first programme that tried to re-organise 
the Turkish economic structure. Fourteen years later another severe crisis hit Turkey, in 
1994. This crisis came, as we show later, after a period of gaining credibility of the 
economic system as a whole. The basic idea of this programs, applied in most of the 
western countries in the eighties, was to re-establish control over prices minimising any 
negative consequences of anti-inflationary policies on output and employment. These 
programs were seen as a new monetary experiment, in as much as the essential aspect was 
based on the announcement of these policies. The idea behind this program was that 
economic policies are more effective if they are credible to the private agents. Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1988) define credibility as a measure of the degree to which policy-makers tie their 
hands on future policies by issuing policy announcements. 
 
This study attempts to assess credibility of disinflation programs in Turkey during the 
nineties. Particular emphasis is on the Stabilisation Program following the 1994 crisis. We 
investigate the credibility of these policies following a previous research made by Agenor 
and Taylor (1993).  
                                                               
1 Gazi Ercel Governor of the Central Bank of  the Republic of Turkey  (CBRT), speech in Prague, September 26, 2000.  
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The study is organised as follows: the first part gives some relevant ideas on credibility. The 
second one is devoted to the analysis of the empirical results of 'credibility' and presents the 
econometric methodologies from other studies. Finally, the last part is devoted to the 
analysis of the model, the hypotheses tested, the methodologies used and the empirical 
results. 
 
 
1. Credibility  
 
Credibility is defined as "the extent to which beliefs concerning a policy conform to official 
announcements about this policy. [...] Credibility may thus also be viewed as a measure of 
the degree to which policy-makers tie their hands on future policies by issuing policy 
announcements"2. Credibility is an attribute that all the policy makers would like to have. 
This gives to the policymakers a 'crucial advantage' in reducing inflation with acceptable 
costs in terms of unemployment and output. 
 
Public authorities have different ways to show they are determinated in pursuing an anti-
inflationary policy. One is to prove that, even in cases of a very deep recession, the 
announced monetary policies will not change. However, following this theory, it could be 
possible to generate a conflict between monetary authority and the government since the 
costs in political terms of an anti inflationary policy may be too large for the government. 
Another possibility is that the monetary authorities can seek to influence expectations with 
some institutional reform, such as change in the exchange rate. According to Schelling 
(1982), "the most a government can commit is an input, not an output; a program, not a 
result. A government can attempt to commit itself on variables it controls; but the promised 
results are only as credible as the commitment and the theory that generates the results. This 
is a weakness of any effort to control inflation through expectations"3.  
 
                                                               
2 Weber (1991, p.62).  
3 Schelling, (1982). 
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Finally, there are two general principles that should be emphasised in a study of the 
macroeconomic credibility problem. First, it should be assumed that if policymakers want to 
build up a very credible policy, a single announcement is not enough. Rational individuals 
need more to go on than mere announcement. They would pay more attention to the 
“policymakers’ reputation” and to the costs of a new policy. Second, “[...] although 
reasonably clear evidence that a new policy rule will work better is a necessary condition for 
its credibility, this is not a sufficient condition” 4. The problem of time inconsistency adds 
additional obstacle to credibility. 
 
 
2. Econometric methodologies and empirical results from other studies 
 
The first problem in analysing credibility from the econometric point of view is related to 
the identification of proxy variable for credibility. The theoretical literature indicates that 
credibility is likely to be time-dependent, having both impact and subsequent effects. If 
credibility evolves over time, there is a real problem of ensuring an adequate data set that 
is capable of picking up the effects. These observations are related to the distinction made 
by Buiter and Miller (1983) between announcement effects and results effects. With these 
considerations in mind, we summarise below the formal econometric investigations that 
have been conducted from empirical studies. 
 
The most commonly used technique in testing for credibility effects is the 'prediction error 
method’. This consists of estimating a model of the inflationary process over the pre-reform 
period and predicting over the post-reform period. Christensen (1987) affirms that "[...] all 
of these investigations suffer from the same general problem associated with the prediction 
error method, namely that it hinges on a rather tenuous comparison between two distinct 
policy regimes. One aspect of this is that the test is only as good as one's confidence in the 
equation estimated to the data for the earlier regime.  Another is that any observed errors 
may explain almost anything not modelled explicitly within the regression model. Only in 
the case where the systematic behaviour of these errors is due solely to the missing 
                                                               
4 Taylor (1982). 
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'credibility variable' will this method be suitable for testing credibility"5. In light of that, it is 
important that different indirect tests are developed that are less susceptible of interpretation 
problems. The second approach, more articulate than the other, was made by Baxter [1985]. 
This study was used to explain some contemporary hyperinflations in Latin American 
countries, more precisely, Chile and Argentina. These two countries were facing, in the late 
1970's, a very severe inflation as a consequence of large fiscal deficits that was financed by 
monetization. In both cases, a program of reform was announced that consisted of monetary 
and fiscal tightening and also, a crawling peg exchange rate that implied successive 
decreasing rates of devaluation of the exchange rate. To examine the credibility of these 
programs, Baxter used an explicit Bayesian approach and argued that " this paper develops 
and implements a method for measuring the credibility of an announced policy reform. 
Agents in the economy learn about the government's policy rules and calculate, using 
Bayesian techniques, the probabilities that these rules belong to a set of 'reform' rules"6. In 
this case, by definition, credibility was considered the subjective probability, specified by 
agents in the economy, that a program of reform had taken place. According to Baxter, “this 
definition of credibility is sufficiently general as to be applicable to any economic policy, as 
will be the method for actual calculation of a measure of credibility"7. 
 
The results of the analysis are summarised in the following points. The policy reform in 
Chile was a partial success while that in Argentina was a substantial failure. These different 
results can be explained by the facts that in Argentina there was a series of unscheduled 
devaluations, which was not evident in Chile. Furthermore, there was the monetary-fiscal 
mix in Argentina which implied an "explosive path for the real value of interest-bearing 
government debt unless the government resorted the monetization"8 (Christensen, 1987). 
These two considerations can give an idea of why Argentinean citizens would have had little 
confidence in their government's commitment to the policy reform. Weber (1991) in his 
study about reputation and credibility in the EMS, used Bayesian univariate time series 
analysis to evaluate credibility effects. He affirms that " the adopted (bayesian) procedure 
consists in finding out how inflation could be forecasted over each sub period under various 
                                                               
5 Christensen (1987 p. 38) 
6Baxter (1985).  
7Baxter (1985 p. 344). 
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alternative assumptions about the degree to which inflation shocks are allowed by the 
central bank to become permanent. The relative success of each of these forecasts is then 
evaluated over time"9. Agenor and Taylor (1993) criticise this approach, because they find it 
"[...] difficult to distinguish between changes in the goodness of fit of the time series model 
generating expectations and changes in the credibility of policy, because potentially relevant 
variables are excluded from the model"10. Clearly, if policy announcements are correlated 
with some of the omitted variables, this can be considered a serious problem, especially if 
these correlations change during the sample period. Finally, time-varying parameter and 
switching regression techniques have also been used to test for credibility. The time -varying 
parameter models, allows the coefficient of the short-run equation to change gradually over 
time, rather than moving instantaneously from the old to the new value as in the switching 
regression model. Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) in their study about the founding of the 
Federal Reserve System in 1914, and the subsequent change in the nominal interest rates 
used switching-regression techniques. They estimated that the most likely date for the 
change in the stochastic process of the short rate was between 1914 and 1915. This estimate 
coincides almost exactly with the date in which the Federal Reserve began operating. 
Despite the positive results of these techniques in some applied studies, "in general, 
difficulty with switching-regression approaches is that, with a single switch point, it is only 
useful for examining regime shifts which are both credible and permanent within the data 
sample period, [...] extending the analysis to allow for two or more switch points would be 
technically cumbersome"11. 
 
 
3. The model  
 
The model will be presented in its analytical form and the basic assumptions. This model 
was applied by Agenor and Taylor (1993) to study the credibility effect of the Cruzado Plan 
implemented in Brazil in 1986, that consisted of a general freeze of prices, the tariffs for 
public services, and exchange rate. Moreover, the government intervention removed wages 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8Christensen (1987 p. 38) 
9Weber (1991, p. 67).  
10Agenor and Taylor, (1993).  
11Agenor and Taylor (1993, p.330).  
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indexation. The procedure followed by the authors was based on the existence, in Brazil, of 
the official foreign exchange rate and the black market or parallel exchange rate market. 
Considering that differences between the Brazilian economic situation and the Turkish 
economic situation existed, the model had to be modified in order to capture the dynamic of 
the economy under investigation. 
 
It has been verified in many studies that the imbalances of the fiscal sector are one of the 
major causes of the high level of inflation in Turkey. More precisely, it is the existence of 
structural weaknesses in the public sector finances that has generated in the last 15 years a 
so high inflation level. This being said, we built our model on two assumptions: 
1. The first assumption is that inflation is a serially correlated process. The reason for this 
rests essentially on the effect of the inertial forces in the economy. Ercel argues that “the 
enduring memory of inflation, as well as negative external developments, have 
prevented a decrease in inflationary expectations. These expectations play a key role in 
breaking down inflationary inertia” 12. Moreover, "the degree of inflation persistent is 
assumed to be inversely related to the degree of policy credibility".13 This is a central 
point of the analysis. Assuming that inflation has a memory (i.e. it is modelled as an 
AR(d) process) implies that Central Bank policies are ineffective. The only actions that 
can effectively reduced inflationary pressure are those bringing credibility to the 
monetary authorities.  
2. The second assumption is related with the definition of an appropriate proxy that is able 
to measure the degree of credibility of a programme, or generally an economic policy 
that can stabilise the level of inflation. This proxy is given by that part of the parallel 
market premium, which is orthogonal to movements in the 'market fundamentals'. The 
Agenor and Taylor considerations were based on the exchange rate markets. They 
consider that if a disinflationary programme loses credibility, agents anticipate the 
acceleration in the inflation rate. "Thus, to avoid the inflation tax on real domestic 
monetary balances, they (agents) switch to foreign currency denominated assets. For 
given supply, the parallel market exchange rate depreciates, and the premium rises, other 
                                                               
12 Gazi Ercel (2000)  
13 Agenor and Taylor (1993, p.330). 
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things equal". 14In the model that we apply in this work we propose a different approach. 
In fact, the idea is to consider how the spread given by the change in the two interest 
rates reacts to an announced disinflationary programme 15. Hence, we assume that the FX 
interest rate is highly sensitive to the change in credibility. The market premium, that is 
the difference between interest rate in domestic currency deposits and interest rate on 
FX deposits, is an endogenous variable. This means that its level will also reflect the 
behaviour of market fundamentals, such as domestic debt position, past domestic 
inflation, foreign prices etc.. The idea of this parallel market premium defined as 
difference of interest rates is based on the assumption it is highly sensitive to market 
expectations regarding current and future government policies, and therefore, is 
considered a good variable for examining credibility effects. Furthermore, the idea is 
that "if movements in the parallel premium cannot be explained by movements in the 
market fundamentals, then the remaining variation must be due to variation in the 
perceived degree of policy credibility". 16 In other words, all the variations in that part of 
the parallel market, include past movements in inflation too, will be strongly influenced 
by the level of reputation and credibility gained by the authorities, and that part can be 
used as an index of credibility. 
 
The model itself can be divided into two parts. The first part consists of decomposing the 
parallel market premium Pt into two components: the 'fundamental component' and 'non 
fundamental component' which will be the basis for a measures of credibility. The general 
form of the model is as follows: 
 
ttt ZLPL eba += )()(  [3.1] 
 
Where )(Lb  and )(La  are, respectively: 
 
k
k LLLL aaaa +++= ...)(
2
21   [3.2] 
                                                               
14 Agenor and Taylor (1993, p.330). 
15It could be objected that capital mobility is subject to some sort of restriction, which could influence the interest rates on FX deposits 
however, following previous works by Altinkemer (1992, 1995) Turkish financial system is fully open since the early nineties. 
16 Agenor and Taylor (1993, p. 331). 
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k
k LLLL bbbb +++= ...)(
2
21  [3.3] 
 
the “at” represent a scalar coefficient, the bi denote conformable coefficient vectors, L is the 
lag operator, and et the residual process.  
 
Rearranging we get: 
 
ktktktktt ZZPPP ---- +++++= bbaa ...... 1111  [3.4] 
 
Equation [3.4] can be interpreted as the first equation in a vector autoregressive system for 
Pt and Zt. According to the basis assumption of the model, the residuals from equation [3.4] 
have zero mean over the estimation period. From the [3.4] we derive our credibility variable 
(ct). It is assumed to be the complement of the error term e t: 
 
ct = -et. [3.5] 
 
The second part of the model consists to estimate, using a Kalman filter approach, a 
'backward-looking' process for inflation with parameters varying with non-fundamental 
component of the parallel market premium. Harvey (1989) discussing about the state space 
form argues that "the key to handling structural time series models is the state space form, 
with the state of the system representing the various unobserved components such as trends 
and seasonals. Once in the state space form (SSF), the Kalman filter provides the means of 
updating the state as new observations become available"17. The Kalman filter is then, a 
recursive procedure of computing the optimal estimator of the state vector at time t, based 
on the information available at time t. One of the reasons for the central role of the Kalman 
filter is that "[...] when the disturbances and the initial state vector are normally distributed, 
it enables the likelihood function to be calculated via what is known as the prediction error 
decomposition. This opens the way for estimation of any unknown parameters in the 
                                                               
17Harvey (1989, p. 10). 
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model"18. Assuming that inflation, pt, is driven by a AR(1) process, we can represent the 
state space form as19  
 
pt = atpt-1 +et  [3.6] 
 
where 
 
at = at-1 + gct + e*t [3.7] 
 
Where [3.6] is the measurement equation with pt and e t are [nx1] vectors and [3.7] is the 
transition equation. at and e*t are [mx1] vectors and ct  is a [mxn] matrix. It is assumed that 
all errors are normally distributed and E(e t e*t-s )=0 for all s.20  
 
Finally, following the theory of Agenor and Taylor (1993) "The Kalman filter recursions 
can then be applied to yield optimal estimates of the state variable sequence (at). The 
resulting estimate of “g“ should be negative: the higher credibility is, the lower the 'inertial' 
effect on inflation”  21. The coefficient at of the equation [3.7] should be smaller after the 
accomplishment of a credible disinflation programme.  
 
 
4. Empirical specification  
 
The choice of this sample was essentially based on the need of including all the main events 
that determined substantial changes in government and monetary policies. It was the latter 
which showed a strong determination in pursuing a 'credible' policy. In fact, despite different 
                                                               
18Harvey (1989, p. 10). 
19Where A stochastic process in which the current value, X t, depends on the previous value, Xt-1, and a white noise disturbance term, et, is 
known as an autoregressive process.  The process may be written Xt=a1Xt-1+a2Xt-2+...+anXt-n+et where  et has mean zero and variance s2, 
and a is a parameter.  This is called an autoregressive process of order 'n', and is denoted by AR(n). 
 
20For a more complete explanation of the Kalman filter approach, the state space form and the measurement and transition equations, see 
Harvey (1989). 
21Agenor and Taylor (1993, p. 332).  
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programmes were implemented, only the last one (end 1999) seems to rely on a concrete 
political support. The lack of political support was, in our opinion, the first reason of the 
previous programmes’ failure. 
 
The model is divided in two steps. The first one consists of decomposing the parallel market 
premium Pt into two components: the fundamental and non-fundamental component. In this 
first step we adopt a general to specific approach. We end up with the following 
specification22: 
 
Pt = f0+ f1Pt-1 + f2Pt-2 + f3INFt+ f4INFt-1 + f5BILLt + f6BILLt-1 + f7EXt +f8EXt-1 + et  
 [3.8] 
 
Where: 
 
· Pt is the parallel market premium, calculate as difference between the change in three-
month domestic interest rate and the change in interest on deposits denominated in US$; 
· BILL is the logarithm of the government expenditure variable; 
· EX is the logarithm of the TL/$ exchange rate ; 
· INF is the three-month inflation rate. It corresponds to the first difference of the log-
normal of the CPI; 
 
Equation [3.8] can be interpreted as the first equation in a vector autoregressive system for 
Pt and all the other independent variables. The right hand side component of [3.8] shows the 
'fundamental factors', which tell us if innovations in the dependent variable Pt can be  
explained by changing in 'fundamental factors'. If not, then the remaining variation is due to 
the variation in the perceived degree of policy credibility. 
 
The second step consists of the estimation using the Kalman Filter approach. A 'backward-
looking' process for inflation with parameters that vary with the non-fundamental 
                                                               
22 We tested also for other variables, for longer lags, and considering annual changes. None of those were found to be significant, 
therefore we dropped from the empirical specification. 
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component (i.e. the error term) of the parallel market premium. The second step of the 
model to estimate (the state space form) is given by 
 
INFt = atINFt-1 + et  (measurement equation) [3.9a] 
 
and 
 
at = at-1 + b1 CREDt + et * (transition equation)  [3.9b] 
where 'CRED' is the credibility variable generated as the complement of the residuals of 
equation [3.8]. 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
As said in the previous paragraph, the first step cons ists in the estimation of Eq. [3.8]. 
Preliminary estimates for the period 1990:4-2001:9 indicates that some of the explanatory 
variables seem to have a structural break at the end of the 2000. Tests made for the whole 
sample show high instability of the parameters, the Chow test indicates a possible break at 
2000:5. In light of this, the sample 1990:4-2000:3 was chosen. Several different seasonal 
dummies and dummies covering crisis periods where tested, none of them was found 
significant and therefore not included in the final specification.  
 
Table 1: equation [3.8]: regression results period (1990-2000) 
 
 CONST DIF(-1) DIF(-2) BILL  BILL (-1) EX EX(-1) INF INF (-1) 
Coeff. .965547 .69914 -.33191 .364E-05 -.373E-05 61.8304 -61.9231 16.3547 -34.2018 
t-stat. .424101       
[.671] 
9.11834       
[.000] 
-4.48721      
[.000] 
3.03477       
[.002] 
-3.09837      
[.002] 
8.28528       
[.000] 
-8.30109      
[.000] 
1.93751       
[.053] 
-4.19063      
[.000] 
R2 0.58 DW 2.10 No Obser.119     
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Table 1 presents the empirical results obtained estimating equation [3.8] for the period 1990-
200023. All the variables appear to be significant at a very low rejection probability. Fig. 1 
shows the credibility measure, that is, the negative of the residuals series, derived from the 
ARDL system. For the period of interest, 1990 to 2000, this measure displays an unstable 
pattern: credibility, except for the years 1992-1994, seems to be on average unstable, at least 
after 1994. Moreover, Fig. 1 shows that the credibility measure fit well with the idea of loss 
of credibility of a disinflationary programme. In fact, during and soon after the crisis, the 
variance of the credibility proxy increases while during a stable period its variance fluctuate 
but at a lower level.  These results could suggest the idea that, even if the economic policies 
were not fully credible, they contributed to reduce on average the fluctuation, in the long 
run, of its variance.  
 
The second part of the model aims at estimating a backward-looking process for inflation 
with parameters varying with the non-fundamental component of the parallel market 
premium, using a Kalman filter approach. In equation [3.9b], the coefficient a , estimated 
using Kalman filter approach, against credibility variable (CRED) has been regressed, in 
order to evaluate the evolution of the credibility coefficient on the inflation. The empirical 
results are summarised in table 2. 
 
Table 2: The transition equation [3.9b]  1990-2000 
 
 Coefficient t-statistic Stand. Error 
CRED -.129824E-02 -1.75479 .739825E-03 
 
The sum of the squared residuals is 1.52 and the Log of likelihood function is 170.848. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the equation [3.9a] and [3.9b] 
using the credibility index derived from the first-order ARDL system are as follows: b1 = 
-0.129824E-02. The coefficient 'b' is negative and significant, as predicted by the model. 
Fig. 2 shows the behaviour of the coefficient at, for the entire sample. More precisely, as 
suggested by the analysis, the persistence effect reflects the behaviour of the prices when 
policy credibility is low.  
                                                               
23 The estimates are obtained using a ML procedure, considering the error term as following and AR1 process. This procedure was 
necessary to correct for serial correlation. 
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The pattern of the coefficient at seems to capture perfectly the economic dynamic of the 
period. Relating Fig.1 and Fig.2 it appears quite clearly that when the credibility variable 
exhibits high variability, the coefficient at has the tendency to rise. 
 
At the beginning of our sample (1991-92) we register an increasing dynamics of the 
coefficient at. The main cause of high inflation persistence might be attribute to the Gulf 
war and the consequent political and economic instability of the period. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the events, in that year the CBRT did not announce a monetary 
program. It follows a period of approximately 15 months of increasing in credibility. 
From the end of 1992 the coefficient at decreased and, after a positive overshot in the first 
months of the 1994, reaches a negative peak during the first semester of that year. At this 
point it is worth to remember how the crisis evolved. “In the last months of 1993, the 
Treasury had tried to keep interest rate low for government securities […] The treasury 
policy to lower interest rates continued during the first months of 1994, which prevented 
the Treasury from borrowing from the domestic market, which in turn resulted in excess 
liquidity, causing an upward pressure on foreign exchange rate.”24 This pattern of the 
coefficient seems to capture perfectly the economic situation (i.e. lack of fiscal discipline) 
in the country in that period. The crisis happened at the end of March 1994, but the 
decrease in credibility starts earlier because agents were already expecting a higher level 
of inflation, following the Treasury policies of debt financing. In the following year the 
situation deteriorates when “[...] in the 1993 CBRT did not announce a monetary program 
because of the difficulty in controlling its balance sheet items due to the inability in 
controlling the financing needs of the public sector” Emir et al. (2000, p. 4). The recover 
at the end of 1994 was mainly due to the IMF intervention and the policy pursued by the 
Treasury. The period that goes from the beginning of 1995 until the end of 1996, shows a 
quite stable trend of the persistence effect, as shown in Figure 2. The value of at came 
back to its pre-crisis value. The increase in budget during the 1995, this might explain 
this sharp boost of credibility. A period of uncertain but, on average, stable credibility 
seems to characterise the last part of the sample. Three might be the explanations: 1) 
                                                               
24 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (1994, p. 33 and 59). 
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monetary policy was acting more on the financial stability rather than on the price 
stability side; 2) the memory of the crisis was still vivid; 3) the budget deficit did not 
appear to decrease, no structural measures were undertaken. During the 1997 inflation 
persistence boosted to its pre-crisis level. Indeed this can be attributed to the world 
economic conditions rather than a sharp lost in credibility by the monetary authorities. In 
fact the world financial crisis which started in Asia and evolved until the Russia crisis 
caused a large outflow of capital from the emerging market (among those Turkey). The 
consequence was an increase in the cost of borrowing both for the private and the public 
sector with a resulting overall economic condition. In the 1998 authorities promoted a 
monetary programme in order to keep inflation at a low and sustainable level, at the same 
time a tight fiscal policy started to have some effect. However, if looking at the CPI and 
at the WPI we see that they exhibited a clear downward trend, suggesting a success of the 
policies, we cannot say the same for the fiscal side. The public debt continued its 
increasing trend. Last period goes from the end of 1998 until May 2000. Despite the 
political instability in the first part of the 1999, figure 2 shows a decreasing trend of the 
persistence effect due essentially to the decision taken by the monetary authority. The end 
of the 1999 saw the launch of a disinflationary programme. The basic goals of this 
programme consisted in reducing the real interest rate, increasing the growth potential of 
the economy and generate a more efficient allocation of the resources in the economy. 
This program was of particular interest since both political and monetary authorities were 
committed to the final goal. Such a co-ordination makes the variable CRED react 
promptly and positively to this new “co-ordinated” program. Inflation persistence (at), as 
a consequence, decreases. Unfortunately this programme failed, or at least had to be 
stopped, because of the strong political crises that occurred in February 2001. One of the 
new instruments of this programme was the pre-announced exchange rate mechanism, 
that is, to construct an exchange rate basket, which was composed of 1 US dollar plus 
0.77 Euro. It would be announced on a daily basis covering one -year period. In doing so, 
additional credibility was gained by the monetary authority from the economic agents. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In light of the existing literature on the impact of the 'credibility' of a disinflationary program 
on the rate of inflation, and in the light of the econometric methodologies for testing such an 
impact, this study has applied a procedure to estimate the size of the credibility factors in the 
context of disinflationary policies in Turkey for the period 1990-2000.  In other words we 
wanted to demonstrate that disinflationary programmes do not have a positive impact if only 
the monetary authorities implement them. The model presented was built on two 
assumptions: (i) inflation is a serially correlated process; (ii)  a proxy that is able to measure 
the degree of credibility of a programme, or generally an economic policy that can stabilise 
the level of inflation is the difference between the 'fundamental' component of the market 
premium and the 'non-fundamental component' of this market with the interest rate of three 
month deposit, and interest rate on three month FX deposit. A recursive Kalman filter was 
then applied in order to verify the impact of the credibility on the inflation pattern. The 
empirical results show that there was a sharp loss of credibility at the end of the 1991 and at 
the beginning of the 1994. The Program that the Central Bank implemented after the crisis 
was not able to restore the level of credibility that the bank had gained previously.  From the 
evidences presented we attribute to the lack of fiscal discipline the main cause of the failure 
of a stable and sustainable inflation rate.  
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Fig.1: CRED (Credibility Variable) 
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Fig.2: Dynamic of the coefficient a1 
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